















	The most straightforward version of reliabilism is one that links justification with de facto, or in situ, reliability, i.e., reliability in the agent’s world and/or environment. This “in situ reliabilism” contrasts with normal worlds reliabilism (Goldman 1986), which appeals to reliability in worlds that satisfy our general beliefs about the world; it contrasts with an actual world reliabilism, which interprets ‘actual’ rigidly, and connects justification to reliability in this world; and it contrasts with (an important element of) indexical reliabilism (Sosa 1993, Comesaña 2002), which combines an in situ dimension with an actual reliability dimension.
	Besides bare simplicity, in situ reliabilism has the advantage of retaining a direct link between justification and truth. Actual world reliabilism, for example, and in situ reliabilism say the same thing about actual agents: their justified beliefs are objectively likely to be true. But actual world reliabilism would allow a nonactual agent to achieve justification by using a process that is reliable here but not in her own world.​[1]​ The resulting belief would be justified although not likely to be true. Conversely, many of this agent’s beliefs that result from reliable processes might be likely to be true but nonetheless unjustified, merely because those processes are not reliable here.
	One of the main reasons for investing in a more unwieldy reliabilism is the so-called New Evil Demon Problem, due to Lehrer and Cohen (1983). It is well-known by now, but worth quoting:
	Imagine that, unknown to us, our cognitive processes, those involved in perception, memory and inference, are rendered unreliable by the actions of a powerful demon or malevolent scientist. It would follow on reliabilist views that under such conditions the beliefs generated by those processes would not be justified. This result is unacceptable. The truth of the demon hypothesis also entails that our experiences and our reasonings are just what they would be if our cognitive processes were reliable, and, therefore, that we would be just as well justified in believing what we do if the demon hypothesis were true as if it were false. (p 192; see also Cohen 1984, p. 281)
In a demon world, all our cognitive processes would be unreliable, but so long as our experiences and reasonings were the same, our beliefs would be justified nonetheless; therefore, reliabilism---in situ reliabilism, at any rate---is false. Or so goes the objection.
	The New Evil Demon Problem (henceforth, NED) has been quite influential. Many epistemologists, internalist and externalist alike, think that NED reveals a fatal flaw with in situ reliabilism, with internalists rejecting reliabilism altogether and reliabilists offering versions of reliabilism that appeal to something other than---or in addition to---reliability in the agent’s world.​[2]​ I think NED poses no real threat to reliabilism, for I think the reliabilist is correct to hold that demonworlders (i.e., the victims of the deceiving demon, or malevolent scientist, or what have you) have very few justified beliefs.​[3]​
	The plan is this: after some preliminaries in section 1, I will try to show that our demon world counterparts really are unjustified in many of their beliefs, just as reliabilism implies. To soften this claim, I argue in section 2 that the reliabilist can nevertheless attribute a positive epistemic status to many of the beliefs of the demonworlder; some, but not all, of these beliefs will actually be justified. This argument relies on the well-known distinction between belief-dependent and belief-independent processes (Goldman 1979); the former yield positive status even in demon worlds. Reliabilism withholds positive epistemic status only from beliefs that result from belief-independent processes. In section 3 I try to show that reliabilism is right to claim that such beliefs are unjustified. Because of the results of section 2, NED is a threat to reliabilism only in the context of a view I call “Seemings Internalism,” (SI), which holds that having an experience as of p prima facie justifies one in believing that p (e.g., Huemer 2001, Pollock 1986, Pryor 2000). SI is false, however, and demon world considerations actually tell against it, not in favor of it. In section 4 I examine and reject two attempts to rescue SI from the arguments of section 3. In section 5 I consider some internalist theories that reject SI; I conclude that these theories do not support the NED objection to reliabilism.

1.	Preliminaries
	It is well known that certain kinds of semantic externalism cause trouble for the very formulation of NED. There’s a popular semantic theory that implies that if demonworlders are not in causal contact with chairs, then they can’t have beliefs about chairs and thus can’t have the same beliefs as I do (Putnam 1981). And there’s a respectable (though perhaps less popular) phenomenological theory that holds that if they’re not in causal contact with red things, then they can’t have experiences as of red and thus can’t have the same experiential states as I do (Dretske 1996, Tye forthcoming). Whether or not semantic externalism has the direct epistemological significance sometimes claimed on its behalf, taking it seriously greatly complicates the discussion of NED. I propose to simply set these difficulties aside and suppose that demonworlders can indeed have the same mental states as the rest of us. This is not because I think the issues in the philosophy of mind don’t deserve to be taken seriously, but because the demon world scenario provides a convenient framework for raising certain fundamental epistemological questions, questions whose importance remains whether the demonic deception is possible or not. 
	For example, demon scenarios render vivid and plausible the epistemic principle that any two agents who are experientially and doxastically identical are justificationally identical as well. Lehrer and Cohen, in the above-cited passage, clearly imply that if two agents have the same experiences and reasoning, then they are justified in the same beliefs. This is, or is very similar to, the view that Conee and Feldman (2004) call “mentalism,” and it’s important that we determine whether it is true. Semantic deflections of NED fail to address this crucial epistemological worry. For these reasons, I will allow that demonworlders can be our psychological duplicates.
	Second, I want to allow for a rather lax reading of ‘in situ’ or ‘de facto’ (which terms I will use interchangeably); the process needs to be reliable where it is, but ‘where it is’ could be interpreted in more or less spatiotemporally restrictive ways. For example, a brain that is removed, envatted for an hour, and then replaced might well count as having reliable cognitive processes and justified beliefs, even during the envatted period. This seems intuitively right and may even preserve the truth connection to an acceptable degree. There are important details to be worked out---we will have to decide whether reliability in the relevant sense is more a matter of track record, or future propensity, etc.---but I don’t want to take a stand on them here. In situ reliabilism comprises a family of theories, offering distinct accounts of what reliability amounts to. NED is intended to be a quite general argument, applying to them all. Whatever exactly de facto reliability turns out to be, it will be quite different from reliability in normal worlds or our actual world.
	Now, NED comes in many varieties, and though I don’t want to attempt a full taxonomy, two significant dimensions of variation should be considered. First, we can distinguish between what I will call evidential and dispositional versions of NED. The Lehrer and Cohen version cited above is an evidential version: the problem for reliabilism is supposed to follow from the fact that the demonworlder has the same beliefs and experiences---in short, the same evidence---as someone whose beliefs are justified. The dispositional versions focus on other factors. Henderson and Horgan’s (2001) contrast between Faith and Constance appeals not to differences in evidence, but differences in how agents use the same evidence. Faith makes hasty generalizations, while Constance is very careful and is watchful for sampling biases and the like. It is not obvious whether such dispositions can be reduced to differences in evidence, and in case they cannot be, I’ll treat dispositional versions of NED as distinct from evidential versions. My focus will be on the evidential versions. I think my treatment of conditional justification below offers a response to the dispositional versions of the problem, but I won’t try to argue that here. I claim only to be able to answer the evidential version.
	The other important dimension of variation concerns the demands of the internalist: one variant of NED complains that reliabilism can discern no difference at all between two subjects  who are in fact epistemically different (e.g., two demonworlders, subjected to an intraworld comparison); another protests that reliabilism does discern a difference between two subjects who are in fact epistemically identical (e.g., one of us and a demonworlder, subjected to an interworld comparison). (Again, contrast Henderson and Horgan 2001 with Lehrer and Cohen 1983, respectively.) My goal is to argue that reliabilism can, in fact, recognize epistemic differences among demonworlders, even though they have comparable numbers of true beliefs; but I also insist that there is an epistemic difference between us and demonworlders, and the demand that they come out to be epistemically identical is an unwarranted one. Thus, I will claim that the challenge to discern a difference in the intraworld comparison is a challenge that can be met, but the challenge to preserve perfect indistinguishability in the interworld comparison is one to which reliabilists should not rise. This latter challenge can be relaxed, to require not perfect epistemic identity but some positive epistemic status on behalf of our demon world counterparts; this challenge can, to a large extent, be met.
	I view reliabilism as first and foremost a theory about prima facie justification. It is hoped that defeat and ultima facie justification can be understood in reliabilist terms as well, though that won’t concern us here. In any case, NED is about the reliabilist requirements for prima facie justification, not defeat. Subsequent discussion of justification should be understood to be concerned with prima facie justification. I will generally omit the qualifier for brevity.
	Finally, I do not intend any of this as an argument for reliabilism. As we will see, there are residual problems for reliabilism, although these problems are different from those thought to be raised by NED. My primary goal is to show that reliabilists can meet NED without giving up the essential features of the view. NED should not cause reliabilists to feel any misgivings about their reliabilism. A secondary goal is to show that certain popular internalist 
theses---Seemings Internalism, mentalism, Evidence Essentialism---all face demon world difficulties of their own. Though it will fall far short of a general refutation of internalism, the discussion here should point out serious difficulties for certain brands of internalism.

2.	Belief-Dependence, Conditional Reliability, and Conditional Justification
	First, for the good news. I want to begin by arguing that reliabilism can, in fact, attribute a positive epistemic status to (some) demonworlders’ beliefs. 
	It is generally recognized, but worth making explicit, that even in a demon world, agents can have many true beliefs and thus some reliable cognitive processes. If rational intuition is reliable here, it’s reliable there. And it presumably is reliable here, or at least certain subtypes or subprocesses of rational intuition are reliable here. Our epistemic counterparts in demon worlds will thus have rational intuition processes that are exactly as reliable as ours. And on the assumption that demonworlders really do have all the same experiential and doxastic states that we do (which I am taking for granted here), their introspective processes are as reliable as our own. So it is just not true that demonworlders don’t have any true beliefs. And of course, since deduction is truth-preserving, anything deduced from these true beliefs will also be true, and so on.
	But this brings me to a more important point, one which may also be generally recognized, though as far as I know, no one ever discusses it. Reliabilism can, and in some incarnations does, distinguish between belief-dependent processes (which count beliefs among their inputs) and belief-independent processes (which do not) (Goldman 1979). Perception, for instance, is generally thought to be a paradigm case of a belief-independent process, while deduction is a paradigm case of a belief-dependent process. Let us extend the terminology to cover beliefs as well, so a belief-independent belief will be one that results from a belief-independent process, and so on. On Goldman’s original (1979) reliabilist theory, a belief-independent belief is prima facie justified iff it’s the result of a categorically reliable process (i.e., one with a high propensity to truth), while a belief-dependent belief is prima facie justified iff it’s the result of a conditionally reliable process (i.e., one with a high propensity to truth, given true beliefs as inputs), all the doxastic inputs to which are themselves be justified. Deduction, since it is conditionally reliable even in demon worlds, will produce justified beliefs there when given justified inputs.
	One quibble about NED and then two serious points: the quibble is that at least one influential version of reliabilism does not, contrary to the standard objections (including Lehrer and Cohen’s), require that memory and inference be reliable; because these are belief-dependent processes, it requires instead that they be conditionally reliable. But demonic interference only threatens categorical reliability. Thus, the standard presentations of NED fail to address a standard version (indeed the locus classicus!) of reliabilism.
	The first serious point to fall out of this quibble is that NED should be understood primarily as a problem concerning belief-independent beliefs. Memory and at least some types of inference are conditionally reliable, even in demon worlds, as much as they are here. If my demon world counterpart is psychologically identical to me, then his memory processes, deductive inference processes, etc. will be conditionally reliable if mine are. Although reliabilism charges demonworlders with vast numbers of unreliably produced beliefs, the bulk of the unreliability can be traced to the unreliability of the belief-independent processes, particularly perception. What makes the demonworlders’ memory processes unreliable is just the fact that so many of the doxastic inputs to these processes are false. The memory processes, however, are still doing their job---they are conditionally reliable. The problem, if there is a problem, is with the reliabilist epistemology of perception, not with the reliabilist epistemology of memory.
	This requires a bit of elaboration. Memory is held by Goldman (1979) to be, as we might say, both epistemologically and psychologically belief-dependent. That is, not only is memory a process that takes beliefs as inputs (making memory psychologically belief-dependent), but it is a process that, like inference, yields justified beliefs only when the beliefs given to it as inputs are themselves justified (making memory epistemologically belief-dependent). Goldman thus holds that all psychologically belief-dependent processes are epistemologically belief-dependent. One might deny this.​[4]​ One might instead think that reliabilism should construe memory as a generative, rather than merely preservative source of justification (see the debate between Lackey 2005, 2007 and Senor 2007).  Either way, the (categorical) unreliability of memory in demon worlds derives from the unreliability of the “feeder” processes, not from memory itself. The internalist thinks that memory should not be epistemically downgraded simply because it is unreliable in demon worlds. The reliabilist agrees: the unreliability of memory is the fault of something other than memory; a good memory is one that is conditionally reliable, not necessarily one that is categorically reliable. Consequently, a reliabilist could drop the justified input requirement, demanding only conditional reliability, and maintain that memory beliefs are justified even in demon worlds. Most reliabilists won’t want to do this, but now it should be clear that the disagreement would concern the question of whether memory is epistemically belief-dependent, and this is orthogonal to the demon world concerns.
	There is some categorical and conditional reliability even in demon worlds. We can take this idea a bit further. Suppose that a roughly Cartesian epistemology adequately captured our perceptual psychology. That is, suppose that we formed perceptual beliefs by first introspecting our perceptual experiences, rationally intuiting the existence and perfection of the Deity, deducing from his perfection that God would not allow us to be massively mistaken about perceptual matters, and then concluding that things were (probably) the way our experiences represent them as being. All of the psychological processes just invoked---introspection, rational intuition, deduction---are categorically or conditionally reliable (as appropriate) in all worlds, including demon worlds. (This is surely a large part of what Descartes liked about the associated epistemology.) Perceptual belief would result from conditionally reliable belief-dependent processes that take justified beliefs as inputs. Perception would still be unreliable---most or all perceptual beliefs would be false---but the perceptual beliefs would be justified, according to a thoroughgoingly reliabilist epistemology. And this epistemology doesn’t involve sophisticated new twists on the original reliabilist theory; it is the original reliabilist theory. 
	Of course, I don’t think that the Cartesian story here is a remotely adequate account of the psychology of perception, but the important point is that if it were, a standard form of reliabilism would imply that our perceptual beliefs were justified, even in demon worlds. The fact that a process results in a large number of falsehoods need not impugn that process as a source of justified beliefs; whether it does or not depends on the decomposition into component processes.
	The second serious point is that this notion of conditional reliability can be employed by the reliabilist to account for the positive epistemic status of some beliefs that are not justified. If (categorical) reliability yields (categorical) justification, we can say that conditional reliability yields “conditional justification”: the output belief is/would be justified if the input beliefs are/were. Conditional justification is not as good as (categorical) justification, but it is an epistemic good. This is quite plausible even independent of the present concerns. Forgetting reliabilism for a moment, suppose an agent draws an impeccable inference from an unjustified belief. The resulting belief is unjustified, but to say only this is to ignore the fact that the agent has achieved some positive epistemic accomplishment by drawing a proper inference, despite the flawed premise. An agent who draws valid inferences from unjustified premises is doing something epistemically right, something that an agent who draws invalid inferences is not. Being conditionally justified in this way is a positive epistemic achievement, and having conditional justification is a positive epistemic status, even if subordinate to being justified. Being justified is a positive epistemic status that is nevertheless subordinate to knowing; why not allow that conditional justification is a positive epistemic status subordinate to justification?
	The reliabilist, therefore, can claim that some of the demonworlders’ beliefs have positive epistemic status, even though they are not justified. This meets, or at least goes a long way toward meeting, the intraworld challenge to discern a difference between agents who are using different reasoning processes: the processes might be equally unreliable but still differ in conditional reliability. It does not meet the interworld challenge to discern no epistemic difference between us and the demonworlders. Conditional justification is not the same as justification, so one who demands that the demonworlders are just as justified as we are will be unsatisfied. 
	I want to say three things about why the gap between justification and conditional justification may not be as great as it seems. First, it is good to keep in mind that when a reliabilist claims that a belief is unjustified, there is no imputation of irrationality or the like involved. An agent might be unjustified in a belief without having any reason to think that the belief is false, or that it is unjustified; she might not even be in a position to have any such reason; she might even be justified in thinking of the unjustified belief that it is justified. On some epistemologies, to say that S is unjustified is to imply, at least suggest, that the agent ought to know better than to hold that belief. This is clearly not true for reliabilism, and especially when the justification failure is due to demonic intervention.​[5]​ So there is no tension between the claim that a belief is unjustified and the claim that it has a positive epistemic status.
	Second, as sketched above, the ‘unjustified’ verdict for conditionally reliable but categorically unreliable processes results not from the reliabilism per se, but from the requirement that the inputs to belief-dependent processes themselves be justified.​[6]​ One could imagine a theory of justification so subjective and so synchronic that it allowed cogent inference from unjustified premises to yield justification. Disagreement with this view should not be confused with disagreement over what counts as a good inference. If the justified-input restriction on belief-dependent processes is the only reason for the downgrade from ‘justified’ to ‘conditionally justified,’ the complaint that reliabilism has failed to preserve interworld epistemic identity is misplaced: when the reliabilist and the internalist disagree about whether a memory of inferential belief is justified or merely conditionally justified, the disagreement is not about the justification-preserving powers of memory, or deduction, or the like. The disagreement is about something else entirely.
	Third, the insistence that we discern no difference is not only misplaced, but quite resistible. The reliabilist who imposes a justified-input requirement for memory is not therefore required to deny that reliably remembered beliefs with unjustified originals have no positive epistemic status. Remembering reliably, like deducing correctly, is an epistemic accomplishment, and the reliabilist is under no obligation to deny this simply because she claims that the output belief is unjustified. It might yet be conditionally justified, and the reliabilist might invoke this positive epistemic status to explain away the intuitions of those who think that memory is a generative source of justification: the generationist is right to think memory beliefs with unjustified originals have positive epistemic status, but is wrong to mistake that positive epistemic status for justification.  Conditional justification is not only a positive epistemic status, one might argue, it’s so close to justification that generationists have confused the one for the other. 
	In any case, there is something to be said in favor of the memory beliefs of demonworlders or normal humans who correctly remember unjustified beliefs---they are conditionally justified---and this ought to be good enough for the reliabilist. If the reliabilist can make good on the claim that the perceptual input beliefs are unjustified, then the merely conditional nature of the memory justification should be quite good enough.
	I want to put these three points together and claim that the test cases for reliabilism, vis-a-vis NED, are cases of belief-independent belief. Conditional justification gives the reliabilist something conciliatory enough to say regarding belief-dependent beliefs.
	The consequences are more significant than might at first appear. Suppose instead of the psychologized Cartesian story, one offered something like the following:
	S has the standing belief that the best explanation for her having consistent and uniform experiences is the overall reliability of the senses (that is, that things are generally how they appear). From this and S’s introspective belief that she’s appeared to redly, S concludes that there’s (probably) something red nearby.
I think there are good reasons to think that perceptual beliefs are epistemologically basic and hence belief-independent (not, as some would argue, because we don’t have beliefs about appearances and such, but because the justification of the perceptual beliefs does not seem to depend on whether these other beliefs are justified) (Lyons 2009a). But I don’t want to insist on any of that now; let’s take seriously this nonCartesian proposal in favor of the belief-dependence of perception. 
	The beliefs just cited include one that results from introspection, one that results from abduction, and one that results from statistical inference (in particular, direct inference). Statistical inference is as conditionally reliable in demon worlds as in the actual world (that is, in demon worlds that are uniform enough as to be indistinguishable from the actual world),​[7]​ so if abduction is also as conditionally reliable, we can treat this in just the same way we treated the Cartesian proposal earlier, and the reliabilist holds that the belief is justified even though the overall process is unreliable, because the component processes were either categorically or conditionally reliable, as the theory demanded. 
	Suppose, though, that abduction is not conditionally reliable in the demon world.​[8]​ Even then the reliabilist can claim that the resulting belief, though unjustified, is conditionally justified, and this should be concession enough. Granted, demonworlders’ perceptual beliefs don’t have the same epistemic status as ours, but they do have positive epistemic status, and reliabilism can account for this with its original machinery of belief-dependent and belief-independent processes. So for belief-dependent beliefs, reliabilism is well-positioned to give the internalists enough of what they want. All the more so if I can show (in the next section) that it really is plausible to deny that the belief-independent beliefs are justified and can trace the gap between full justification and mere conditional justification to these.
	Of course, internalists who are attracted to the kind of story just offered propose it as an epistemological account of perception, not a psychological account. This is an unstable position, however. What the reliabilist is clearly after is a theory of ex post, doxastic justification, what Feldman and Conee (1985) call “well-foundedness”: the agent must be believing for the right reasons; mere possession of such reasons is not enough. Given this concern, an appeal to the agent’s belief in the reliability of perception can’t really be getting at part of the agent’s justification for holding some perceptual belief, unless the perceptual belief is in some sense causally or counterfactually dependent on the reliability belief, at least in the sense that if the agent didn’t have the reliability belief, she wouldn’t have or wouldn’t retain the perceptual belief. But this is sufficient for a belief to be one of the inputs to a cognitive process. There is no reason reliabilism should eschew tacit beliefs as inputs, so long as they make a difference as to what outputs are produced.​[9]​ As an illustration, recall the Cartesian theory. Even if it succeeded on other grounds, it would fail as an account of what in fact justifies our perceptual beliefs if it turned out that our perceptual beliefs were insensitive to our religious beliefs (as they almost certainly are).
	So anyone who holds that our perceptual beliefs epistemically depend on other beliefs is subject to the following dilemma. Either the epistemological account has sufficient psychological reality to underwrite a theory of ex post, doxastic justification, or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t, then it only tells us how agents could be doxastically justified in their perceptual beliefs, not how they are; it indicates neither how nor whether our perceptual beliefs really are ex post, doxastically justified. If, however, the account does have psychological reality, then it’s the reliabilist theory of belief-dependent, rather than belief-independent beliefs that’s at issue, but that theory doesn’t give the offending verdict about demon worlds. So once again, if one is going to press a NED attack on reliabilism, it really has to focus on belief-independent beliefs, that is, beliefs that are both psychologically and epistemologically belief-independent. 
	To summarize, with the possible exception of abduction (see note 8 above), it’s really just perceptual beliefs that reliabilism gets the obviously “wrong” answer on and even then, only because the reliabilist assumes that perception is belief-independent. To pursue NED, then, let’s embrace the independently plausible view that perception is belief-independent, and try to suppose that my demon world counterpart has the same justification for his beliefs as I have for mine. Together, these lead to a view I call “Seemings Internalism”:
	(SI):	If S is is appeared to as if p, then S is prima facie justified in believing that p.
Is this view really as plausible as its popularity would suggest?​[10]​ In particular, does it have any advantage over reliabilism in its verdicts about demonworlders?

3.	Belief-independent beliefs in a demon world
	I have tried to show that if NED is to cause any real embarrassment to reliabilists, it will have to be because reliabilism is wrong to insist that the belief-independent beliefs of demonworlders are unjustified. Since my attention is restricted to evidential versions of NED, this comes down to the question of whether the evidence we have for our belief-independent beliefs (in particular, our perceptual beliefs) mandates that our demon world counterparts believe as we do. The question, that is, is whether the belief-independent evidence for our perceptual beliefs---our experience---requires demonworlders to adopt our perceptual beliefs as well.
 	I use ‘mandate’ and ‘requires’ intentionally here, for it is important to see what the proponent of NED is presupposing. Clever presentations of NED encourage the reader to view the reliabilist as imposing draconian strictures on justification. It seems as if the reliabilist “blames the victim,” forbidding her from doing what we get to do, simply because she has the bad fortune to be in a demon world. By contrast, the internalist is seen as being far more generous, lenient, and forgiving about belief formation. But in truth, the internalist is not more lenient. To say that my demon world counterpart is justified in exactly those beliefs I would be justified in believing is to prohibit him from forming beliefs in certain ways, and that prohibition is not well motivated.
	Consider the following little story:
	The travelers passing the time at Grand Interworld Station are a diverse lot. There are terrestrial humans of all eras, but there are also centaurs, unicorns, Norse deities, sentient teapots, talking lions, swampmen, inhabitants of Mars, Alpha Centauri, and Twin Earth, and more. Often they ignore each other and wait for a train back to their own possible world. But today a number of them are gathered around listening to a Cartesian demon discuss its ongoing exploits with poor Larry. The demon directly produces in Larry various sense esperiences, E1, E2, etc., to which Larry responds by believing, respectively, that there's something red nearby, that there's something wet, etc. The demon is, of course, able to produce the relevant experiences in the minds of its listeners as a means of telling its story, which makes the demon quite a popular storyteller.
	The demon is expressing dismay, however, because Larry is getting everything systematically wrong. He responds to E1 with the belief that something is red, when he was supposed to respond by believing that something is green; E2 was supposed to produce the belief that there’s something soft, but Larry responds by believing there’s something wet. The humans listening to the story, like the demon, are puzzled by Larry’s apparent irrationality. Something that looks a bit like a toilet plunger speaks up: “I don’t see what’s the matter. Larry is perfectly justified in his beliefs. I don’t know how things are on Earth or wherever you demons are from, but for us on Tralfamadore, what you’re calling E1 is the experience we associate with redness; what you’re calling E2 is the one we associate with wetness, and so on. Larry is believing just as we would, and just as he should.” 
	After making sure that the demon is, in fact, producing the same sense experiences in all the listeners, it becomes clear that the audience can’t agree about Larry’s epistemic status. The colortemps (Markie 2004) are baffled that someone would believe that something is red or green on the basis of a sensation that clearly indicates that an object is 78 degrees F. Mary, a brilliant but sheltered neuroscientist, thinks Larry shouldn’t believe anything on the basis of E1. There are also disagreements about what Larry does not believe. Larry sometimes has visual imagery of famous people pop into his head, but if he happens to catch an image of the president in front of a notable New York landmark, he persists in believing the news report that says the president is in Washington. The clairvoyants in the audience disapprove of his disregarding important defeaters. Similarly, he sometimes feels a vague sense of dread, but he doesn’t take it seriously; if inductive evidence indicates the situation is going to be okay, he goes with induction. Most of the humans approve of this; Spiderman and Socrates think he’s being irrational, ignoring important defeaters.​[11]​ Plantinga claims that this is what the output of the sensus divinitatus feels like, and Larry is now warranted in believing in God (but not that danger is immanent). 
	Unsurprisingly, many of the audience members respond to their experiences in a different way than do other audience members. Equally unsurprisingly, each demands that Larry respond to his experiences in the way they would.

	This fable suggests that some of our intuitive judgments about demonworlders are chauvinistic and parochial, and therefore not to be taken very seriously. We think Larry is justified when he’s forming beliefs the way we should, but if we were from Tralfamadore, we’d want Larry to form beliefs in a very different way. The problem is that we can’t allow Larry to form beliefs in (just) our preferred manner without prohibiting him from forming them in some other manner, and there’s no good reason for this prohibition.
	Let us say that a perceptual function is a function from experiences to beliefs.​[12]​ An agent satisfies the perceptual function f(e) = b just in case whenever that agent has experience e it forms belief b. An epistemic function is an assignment of justificational status (justified, unjustified) to experience/belief mappings. An agent satisfies the epistemic function g(e, f(e)) = j just in case the value of j is ‘justified’ whenever e justifies that agent in believing f(e). A perceptual function describes the agent’s psychology; an epistemic function describes the agent’s epistemology. 
	Different cognizers will satisfy different epistemic functions. Some of this will be uninteresting and due only to the fact that they have different experiential repertoires and therefore perceptual functions with different domains. But some will be due to the fact that different cognizers are justified in different, incompatible, experience-belief mappings. If we represent epistemic functions as sets of experience-belief-justificational status triples, we can say that two epistemic functions conflict iff they contain one or more triples that differ only in the third position. Two agents therefore will satisfy conflicting epistemic functions if the same experience makes the one but not the other justified in some belief.
	The Grand Interworld Station story is supposed to make plausible the claim that it is possible for two agents to satisfy conflicting epistemic functions (I take it the possibility of different perceptual functions is obvious enough to not need any serious defense).​[13]​ The Tralfamadorians’ epistemic function conflicts with ours (experience-belief mappings that are justified for us are unjustified for them, and conversely); the Tralfamadorians are no less justified simply because their perceptual functions differ from ours. If this plausible claim is true, then what are we to do about poor Larry? “Allow” him to satisfy our perceptual function, which in effect requires him to do so, thereby forbidding him from satisfying other, conflicting, perceptual functions? This seems arbitrary and chauvinistic. Better, it seems, to prohibit all experience-belief mappings on the grounds that they are equally unreliable than to endorse one over the others on the grounds that it is ours.​[14]​
	Here’s a convergent line of thinking: we would offer different verdicts about the demonworlders if we came from different worlds or had different cognitive capacities, and this fact suggests that our verdicts about demonworlders are not so much judgments about what they should believe but about what we should believe were we to undergo the experiences they’re undergoing. But this latter judgment is no direct threat to reliabilism. If I were undergoing those experiences, I’d be justified in the resulting beliefs, true, but if I were undergoing those experiences, those beliefs would be reliably formed, so the case is no counterexample to reliabilism.​[15]​ It is only if they, the demonworlders, are justified in their unreliably formed beliefs that reliabilism is in any danger. 
	I have been taking the notions of a demon world counterpart, and an epistemic counterpart more generally, as primitive. What features must an agent share to be justificationally identical to me? Obviously, one who shares all my properties, including the relational properties, will be equally justified in all the same beliefs as I am, but just as obviously, this is no worry for reliabilism. The intuitive answer, and the answer that serves as the starting point for NED, is that any two experientially and doxastically identical agents are justificationally identical as well, so x and y will count as epistemic counterparts just if they are experientially and doxastically identical.
	The problems we have been seeing here, however, result directly from our thinking of the demonworlders only in terms of their beliefs and experiences. NED presupposes a reductionistic view of epistemic agents as nothing more than perceptual functions, and the current thought experiment is supposed to show how problematic that assumption really is. Back to the Grand Interworld Station:
		At some point, someone hits on a way to resolve the disputes. They ask whether Larry is a human, a Tralfamadorian, or what. Each of the listeners had been assuming Larry was one of their own. (It turns out ‘Larry’ is a very common name.) The question seems to get at something important, for if Larry is a normal human, then perhaps certain experience-belief mappings are appropriate; if not, then some other, incompatible, experience-belief mappings are appropriate, depending on just who and what Larry is. The demon’s response is disappointing: “Oh, Larry isn’t any of those things; he’s a disembodied spirit I manufactured by breathing on a lump of clay.” 
	
The idea here is that if the demonworlder could somehow be “anchored” to some type of world, or body, or environment, or cognitive architecture, or phylogenetic history, or something, we could make a nonarbitrary choice among conflicting epistemic functions. That is, if Larry somehow belongs in some environment, or possible world, or the like, then this might bind him to some particular perceptual function or functions, thus ruling out the others. I think this admittedly vague suggestion is very plausible, but it is off the table as far as NED is concerned, for NED is supposed to show that any creature with the same experiences as I have is therefore justified in forming the same perceptual beliefs as I am, that our psychological counterparts are our epistemic counterparts as well, and this is supposed to show that justification is determined by the agent’s psychological states---in the case of belief-independent beliefs, by the agent’s experiential states. But then the right epistemic function must be the same for everyone; “unanchored” demonworlders should be no different from the “anchored” ones. This, however, seems wrong: if Larry is really unanchored, then he has no right to arbitrarily “choose” one perceptual function over the others; there is nothing to make the perceptual function he satisfies better than the ones he does not satisfy.
	Lehrer and Cohen may be alive to this; perhaps this is why their version of NED, quoted above, features us as the victims of the demon. NED is supposed to argue for, or at least pump the intuition in favor of, mentalism: the view that if two agents are alike with respect to all their nonfactive mental states, then they are alike with respect to justification. But we are anchored to a world/environment/etc., so if the plausibility of the NED argument for mentalism derives from it being us who are deceived by the demon, that plausibility is spurious. The Interworld Station story, by focusing on agents who are our experiential/doxastic counterparts but not in any sense us, is supposed to pump the opposite intuition: there are conflicting epistemic functions, which shows that justification is not determined entirely by mental states, that is, not entirely by perceptual functions.
	Recall the normal worlds solution to NED and the problems with it. According to normal worlds reliabilism (Goldman 1986), justification is a matter not of reliability in situ, but in normal worlds, i.e., worlds that conform to our general beliefs about how the actual world is. Normal worlds reliabilism answered not only NED but the famous clairvoyance objections (BonJour 1985) to reliabilism. Clairvoyance is not reliable in normal worlds, so clairvoyance is not a justification-conferring cognitive process. One problem with the normal worlds view, however, was just this: it implied that clairvoyance couldn’t yield justified beliefs---for any kind of creature---and this seems too restrictive. Treating unanchored demonworlders as if they were anchored to our world poses a very similar problem. Somewhere in the space of possible worlds there are creatures with reliable clairvoyant powers, who are justified in their clairvoyance beliefs, and whose experiential evidence is just like something that would not give us evidence of distant facts. When I have a mind’s-eye visual image of the president in New York, I’m not (prima facie) justified; some possible cognizer, however, is.
	The deeper problem for normal worlds reliabilism, however, was that it seemed arbitrary, parochial, and chauvinistic to deny justification to others, simply because their worlds aren’t the way we imagine ours to be. It would be a more generous but still illicit sort of favoritism to grant justification to their beliefs, which are inappropriate in their world, but would be appropriate if their world were the way we think ours is. It is similarly unprincipled and provincial to avow justified (/unjustified) status for the beliefs of unanchored demonworlders, simply because those beliefs would be justified (/unjustified) if those agents were anchored here. Man is not the measure of all things.
	Sosa (2007) and others have held that justified belief is a matter of exercising a certain kind of skill. Let’s pursue the analogy between perceptual belief and motor skills a bit in the context of demon worlds. It is interesting in this connection to ask what skills, if any, Larry possesses. Is he, for instance, a good swimmer or a good violinist? In some uninteresting sense Larry is neither, since he doesn’t have arms with which to swim or operate a violin. But this quick answer masks a more interesting question about what it takes to have a skill. A disembodied brain can still have motor skills, in the sense of having a kind of procedural knowledge: motor programs and schemas that would allow the brain, if properly embodied, to swim well or play the violin well. Could such motor programs make an unanchored demonworlder a good violinist or a good swimmer? I think not, for the sorts of reasons we have been seeing. 
	Michael Phelps is superb at swimming in his body, in liquids of a certain viscosity and density, in gravitational fields of a certain strength, with certain laws of nature operative. But surely his swimming ability is not robustly resistant to perturbation by changes in these variables. And clearly, this is no real knock on his virtues as a swimmer.​[16]​ He is little or no less skilled as a swimmer for not having mastered the art of propelling his body through motor oil (a task which, one might assume, would require very different strokes and strategies) or of moving through water in a young girl’s body---or a dog’s, or a fish’s---instead of his own. Does a disembodied and unanchored psychological duplicate of Phelps count as a skilled swimmer merely because there is some set of possible body/environment/world complexes in which he is actually good at swimming? By that token I would be---rather, I am---a talented violinist: I have enough motor control over my vocal organs that, were the peripheral nerves rewired appropriately, I’d be able, at least after a few minutes of practice, to use my speech routines to control a violin with a great deal of skill. (Well, maybe not a violin, but probably a banjo, and certainly a bagpipe; nevertheless, I am not a talented bagpiper.) The fact that my motor schemas would lead to superb performance in some possible worlds, though not in the world I’m in, indicates perhaps that I could in some sense be skilled at x, not that I am skilled.​[17]​ If being epistemically justified is a cognitive achievement, importantly analogous to exercising a motor skill, this gives us further reason to deny that demonworlders are justified.
	But what, then, should poor Larry do? If he is not justified in his perceptual beliefs, then he should presumably suspend those beliefs, but surely he’s been given no reason to think that suspending belief is any more appropriate than believing or disbelieving.​[18]​ Reliabilists have two options here. One is to say that Larry is in a no-win situation; there simply isn’t anything he can do that’s epistemically correct. It doesn’t follow from the fact that he’s unjustified in believing that p, that he is more justified in disbelieving or withholding p. All these doxastic attitudes might be unjustified; just as Larry is no better off believing that it’s red than he is believing that it’s green, Larry is also no better off suspending belief than believing. The other option is to admit that Larry ought, in some sense, to suspend belief, but only in the sense that he would be epistemically better off doing so. Of course, this sense of ‘ought’ is not a reasons-involving sense, and there’s no implication that Larry could come to know by mere reflection what he thus ought to do. This is a reliabilist notion of justification we are working with, after all, and it is illicit to conclude from the claim that Larry is unjustified in believing that p, that Larry thereby has any reasons that put him in a position to appreciate the epistemic superiority of withholding p over believing p.​[19]​
	I have been working with an intuitive but undefined notion of anchoring, not to be vague, but to be noncommittal. What is it to be a Tralfamadorian: to have been born on Tralfamadore? to have lived there recently? to have a certain genome? a certain phylogenetic history? We can remain neutral on these questions by defining an anchoring as a specification of whatever it is that determines an epistemic function for any given satisfaction of a perceptual function. (If it’s the agent’s environment that makes certain experience-belief mappings epistemically proper, then an anchoring for that agent will be a specification of the relevant environmental features, likewise mutatis mutandis for species, body, phylogenetic history, and the like). SI claims in effect that the null anchoring always suffices: nothing more is needed to determine an epistemic function than the perceptual function. The goal of this section has been to argue that this is false; different possible agents satisfy different perceptual functions and are, intuitively, right to do so, i.e., they satisfy conflicting epistemic functions. 
	What, then, of our unanchored demonworlders? Given only a perceptual function without an anchoring, it seems that we can only deliver relativized verdicts: X is justified relative to a Tralfamadorian anchoring, but not relative to a normal human anchoring; Y is justified relative to a normal human anchoring but not relative to a clairvoyant-with-electeroception anchoring, etc. Given that these agents are demonworlders, there is no clear sense in which any perceptual function is intrinsically superior to any other---all are, for instance, equally unreliable---so there is no apparent way to discharge the relativization.​[20]​ If this is right, then we must either arbitrarily choose one perceptual function from the (infinitely) many and allow/require them to satisfy it, or deny that the satisfaction of any perceptual function makes their beliefs justified.​[21]​ The first option is unprincipled and chauvinistic; I have therefore been recommending the second. 
	This is all conditional, however, on the claim that possible cognizers satisfy epistemic functions that conflict with ours. There are two credible ways in which one might try to deny this, without giving up on Seemings Internalism and the view that perception is belief-independent. I turn to these next.

4. Evidence Essentialism
	“Evidence Essentialism” is the view that evidential relations hold necessarily: 
	(EE): 	If e is evidence of h for S, then necessarily, and for any S, e is evidence of h. 
It is an intuitively plausible view, provided we read ‘e’ as picking out the whole of S’s evidence regarding h, not just some part of it. Evidence Essentialism, however, would imply that factors like the agent’s environment or anchoring, contingent probabilistic relations between e and h, and psychological factors that are not part of the agent’s evidence (e.g., cognitive capacities, learning history, etc.), are irrelevant to justification.
	Seemings Internalism (SI) is committed to Evidence Essentialism (EE), at least as far as seemings are concerned, but one could hold EE without endorsing SI. SI results from combining EE with evidentialism (the view that justification is entirely determined by one’s evidence) and the claim that perceptual beliefs (or whatever beliefs have corresponding seemings states) are belief-independent.​[22]​ The Grand Interworld Station story is supposed to show that possible agents satisfy conflicting epistemic functions, and thus that SI is false. If perception is belief-independent, as per our working assumption, and evidentialism is true, then EE is false as well.
	Central to my story is the apparent contingency between the experience and the belief it allegedly justifies. One might try to close this gap by working from either end, either by understanding the experience in such a way as to severely delimit the beliefs it could justify, or by understanding the belief in such a way as to delimit the experiences that could justify it. These yield two lines of response to the foregoing argument. The first is to insist that seemings, or experiential states, are more abstract than I have been assuming; the second is to endorse something like Pollock’s (1986) epistemological theory of concepts. Either way, the result would be that conflicting epistemic functions are not satisfied after all, and the problems of the previous section do not arise.
	The first way to retain Evidence Essentialism (not to argue for it, but to resist the Interworld Station objection to it) is to claim that I have misidentified the relevant elements of the perceptual function: the nondoxastic experiences that do the epistemic work are high level and abstract states, not the states that differ among the passengers at the Interworld Station. Take the case of color inversion without error: you and I both believe there’s something red, even though the way it looks to you is the spectral opposite of the way it looks to me, and so on with the other colors. The same low level sensation might accompany my justified belief that it’s red and your justified belief that it’s green, thus apparently vitiating EE and SI. The current proposal, however, is that we interpose an abstract experiential state between the sensations (which differ) and the beliefs (which do not). If the high level, abstract, appearances are the same, and these appearances are the experiential states invoked by SI to serve as evidence for perceptual beliefs, then both EE and SI can be retained.​[23]​ Even though you and I have different sensations, it looks red to both of us, in the relevant sense of ‘looks’. This “looking red” is a nondoxastic experiential state distinct from the raw sensory phenomenology that differs between the normal and the invert. Similarly, the human and the Tralfamadorian have the same raw sensory phenomenology but not the same total nondoxastic experience, because one is appeared to wetly while the other is appeared to softly, and so on. If perceptual functions involve these abstract appearances, there need not be any conflict among epistemic functions.
	Such a view might also explain how something can look---in some sense---the same to the expert and the novice, even though they are justified in different perceptual beliefs. The bird produces the same sensation in the expert and the novice, but the expert is justified in believing it’s a pileated woodpecker, while the novice is not (Cf. Feldman 2003, Lyons 2005). Perhaps this is because the expert is appeared to pileated-woodpecker-ly while the novice is only appeared to birdly. That is, the expert has a high level appearance with the content pileated woodpecker, and the novice does not.
	Notice, however, how far these high level, abstract appearances are from the sensory states we normally associate with perceptual experience. There is nothing particularly spatial about the expert’s pileated woodpecker appearance, for example, and there is nothing visually red about the invert’s being appeared to redly. Huemer (2007), for example, seems to think that perceptual appearances are of a piece with the appearances involved in memory, introspection, rational intuition, and maybe more. The distinctively visual (auditory, etc.) experiences have been left far behind in exchange for the abstract states. This ought to make us somewhat dubious about the appeal to such states: what exactly are they, and what reason is there to believe in them?
	This brings me to the first of three objections to the attempt to save SI by this sort of abstract appearance gambit. I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Lyons 2005, 2009a, 2009b) that there is some reason to think that such high level appearances really are just beliefs, indeed the very beliefs they are alleged to justify. This claim fits well with the putative contents of such states (e.g., pileated woodpecker) as well as with their abstract, non-sensory nature, and it simplifies our ontology of perception. The standard objection to this view is woefully inadequate. It holds that because something can seem F to me---in the currently operative sense of ‘seem’---even when I don’t believe that something is F, something’s seeming to me to be F is different from my believing that something is F. Such an objection misses the point entirely, for it only shows that seeming and believing are different types, not that this (token) seeming is distinct from this (token) believing. Being a butcher is one thing, and being a baker is another, but that doesn’t show that my butcher and my baker are two different people. The fact that it can seem to be some way I don’t believe it to be does not show that there is a seeming state distinct from the belief state, even in cases where I do believe things to be the way they seem. Instead, we should think of the result of perception as being an identification or classification: roughly, an ascription of some properties to something. When that identification has the appropriate functional role, it is a (perceptual) belief; when it doesn’t, it is a mere percept. But there’s no residual percept (i.e., no identification with the same content as the belief) distinct from the belief in cases where perception results in perceptual belief as normal (Lyons 2009a). Of course, if the high-level “appearance states” are really just beliefs, then they can’t play the role SI requires of them, for they are supposed to be nondoxastic (and thus suited to stopping the epistemic regress) and distinct from beliefs (so they can serve as reasons for those beliefs).
	The second objection is that seemings of this sort don’t make for a plausible epistemology anyway, for such seemings are present even for beliefs that are not prima facie justified; they are present, in fact, for approximately all beliefs. Every time I---nonvoluntarily---believe that p, it seems to me as if p. SI would imply that all (nonvoluntary) beliefs are prima facie justified, which they aren’t. This objection doesn’t depend on the claim that the belief and the seeming are the same; p’s seeming true might instead be a phenomenal property of the belief.​[24]​ The paradigm cases of it seeming to me as if p are cases where my experience inclines me toward believing that p, or makes believing that p attractive, or makes p seem true. If this inclination or attraction or seeming true is what SI has in mind, then SI would imply that nearly all beliefs are prima facie justified.
	It is common to reply by insisting that not all beliefs have this property of seeming true. The belief that 2+2=4 does, but the Banach-Tarski theorem, for instance, doesn’t; in fact the Banach-Tarski theorem seems false.​[25]​ Now, certainly there’s a phenomenology of obviousness that is connected to the consideration of simple a priori truths, which is not connected to the consideration of other truths. I can’t so much as consider my own existence without its seeming true, though I can consider your existence without its seeming true. But this doesn’t show that this seeming true isn’t a property of all beliefs; it only shows that it’s not a property that attaches to belief contents---propositions---irrespective of the propositional attitude taken toward that content. My claim was not that seeming true attached to the content, but rather to the attitude of believing. Thus, I can’t believe something that doesn’t seem true, even though I now believe many propositions that didn’t always seem true and might not seem true later.
	Though I can consider the Banach-Tarski theorem without its seeming true, I can’t nonvoluntarily believe it without its seeming true. In my case, logicians I respect tell me it’s true, and that makes it seem true to me. This is compatible with its at the same time seeming false, just as in the waterfall illusion, things seem to move and yet also seem to stand still at the same time.​[26]​ ​[27]​ 
	High level, abstract experiences promise a way to make the same thing “look red” to both the normal and the invert, to the human and the Tralfamadorian, even though their sensations are radically different. But this trivializes the experiences, for “looking red” in this sense is little or nothing more than ‘it’s red’ seeming true, which is epistemically irrelevant. If there’s yet another kind of “looking red” beyond the (perceptual) belief that something is red, beyond the phenomenal seeming true attached to that belief, and beyond the sensory experience, it would be good to know what it might be. If the appearance is not a belief, it’s not a property of the belief, and it’s not the familiar (so to speak spatial, colorful) sensory experience whose connection to belief is merely contingent, then it is something quite mysterious.
	The third objection is that the abstract appearance gambit addresses only some of the problems raised by the Interworld Station objection anyway. The perceptual functions of other possible agents will differ from ours in at least three ways. First are intra-modal remappings, as in the color inversion cases, where the experience-belief mappings are rewired within a single sense modality. Next are intermodal remappings, as in the colortemp case, where experiences appropriate to one of our sense modalities get matched up, perhaps systematically, with beliefs appropriate to a different sense modality; experiences that would lead us to believe something is red lead them to believe something is 78 degrees. Third, however, are alien modalities, like clairvoyance, God detection, a danger sense, electeroception, and the like; we can include here significant extensions of our familiar sense modalities, like ultra-violet vision, infra-red heat “vision,” echolocation, and so forth. At the very most, the abstract appearance gambit handles the first two kinds of remapping. 
	Norman the clairvoyant is appeared to the-president-is-in-New-York-ly. Setting aside the first two objections above, do we---does the internalist---want to say that anyone thus appeared to is prima facie justified in believing the president is in New York? Since it is the high-level appearances that are doing the work, Norman should be justified no matter what kind of low-level experiences he is having. In fact, he should be justified even if he isn’t having any of the familiar sensory (again, spatial, colorful, etc.) phenomenology at all. This does not strike me as the sort of view an internalist would want to endorse; nor is it very plausible in its own right. If I were to---suddenly and for no good reason---have a high level electeroceptive experience like that of an intelligent shark, and it seemed to me that there was an object about my size, producing certain electrical field perturbations, on the other side of the wall behind me, would I be justified in this belief? Surely not. Or suppose I am afraid and have had too much coffee, and this makes it seem to me that something bad was going to happen---the same seeming that Spiderman enjoys when his nonconscious peripheral visual systems latch onto certain environmental stimuli that reliably correlate with danger. Are we equally justified in our beliefs about immanent danger? If there’s anything plausible about the Grand Interworld Station claim that different experience-belief mappings are justified for different agents, then the appeal to abstract appearances does little to allay the worry. If anything, it exacerbates the problem: imagine the electeroceptive seeming without any low level sensory phenomenology.
	In the end, the appeal to high level, abstract appearances does not make for a very plausible epistemology. Consequently, it does little to defend SI and EE against the Interworld Station objection.
	Before moving on, recall that our central question is whether NED poses a crippling objection to reliabilism. SI, especially when augmented with the high level, abstract understanding of appearances as just detailed, is a controversial view, one that is not at all obviously true. Surely not even all the proponents of NED hold this odd view about nondoxastic experience. If it is only on the prior assumption of this controversial articulation of Seemings Internalism that NED threatens reliabilism, this is good news for reliabilism. 
	The second way to defend EE and SI is to understand concepts in such a way that the connection between beliefs and their justifiers is no longer contingent. Pollock’s epistemological theory of concepts is roughly this: included in the content of any nonlogical concept is a specification of the criteria that would count as evidence for the instantiation of that concept. Thus, if I take E1 as evidence of redness and you don’t, then you and I are not operating with the same concept of red. This implies that the Interworld Station myth is confused. If the Tralfamadorians disagree with us about what is evidence of wetness, then we and the Tralfamadorians don’t share a concept of wet, even if our concepts are extensionally equivalent. But that means that the Tralfamadorians and we don’t have the same beliefs, and thus that there couldn’t be conflicting epistemic functions after all.​[28]​
	Obviously, I will deny the epistemological theory of concepts. It strikes me that the fact that the theory implies that the Tralfamadorians couldn’t have the same concept of wetness---and thus couldn’t share my belief that water is wet---is already more evidence against that theory than has been adduced in favor of it. Furthermore, since I, like some other epistemologists, think that nondoxastic experiences don’t serve as reasons, or evidence, it would seem to follow that I couldn’t agree with Pollock about what color the chair is, whether there even is a chair, and so on. 
	A decisive disproof of the epistemological theory of concepts would require more than this and would take us quite far afield. But a decisive disproof is not required for the present purposes. NED is supposed to offer a straightforward refutation of reliabilism, a pithy counterexample that has intuitive pull on everyone and can be embraced and wielded by any internalist. But the epistemological theory of concepts is far from obvious, and if NED can’t get by without it, then then NED argument comes down to the conclusion that we cannot endorse both reliabilism and the epistemological theory of concepts. This is hardly just a roundabout way of stating that reliabilism is false. The reliabilist can reject the theory of concepts without undue distress. One could, of course, develop a positive argument to the effect that the epistemological theory of concepts is true; therefore, Evidence Essentialism is true; therefore in situ reliabilism is false. By then, however, NED has fallen out as irrelevant.

5.	The New Evil Demon Without Seemings Internalism
	Seemings Internalism founders on the problem of unanchored demonworlders, developed in section 3. The attempts to salvage SI, examined in section 4, did not look promising. Let us abandon SI, then, and see what remains of NED.
	SI holds that if two cognizers are experientially identical, they are justificationally identical. Mentalism (Conee and Feldman 2004) holds that if two cognizers are mentally identical, they are justificationally identical. The latter appeals to a broader supervenience base and so is clearly more likely to be true. One obvious way to relax the restrictions of SI is to suppose that the agent’s other beliefs contribute to the justification of her perceptual beliefs, that experiences justify perceptual beliefs only in conjunction with other, background beliefs. Perceptual and epistemic functions would be reconceived accordingly (see note 12), and there would cease to be conflicting epistemic functions after all, so long as the different possible perceivers had different background beliefs about which experiences reliably indicate which external states of affairs. 
	There are well known challenges for such a view and correspondingly good reasons for thinking that perception is belief-independent (the belief-independence of perception seems to be the predominant view, even among internalists). I will pass these by in favor of the dilemma rehearsed above: if perceptual belief does not depend causally or counterfactually on the background beliefs, then these beliefs are irrelevant to an epistemological theory that is concerned with the question of doxastic, ex post, justification. If it does, then perception is belief-dependent, and the reliabilist has a story about conditional justification to answer the NED. We would need to know the details about these background beliefs and how they figure into the justification of perceptual beliefs, but the reliabilist should be able to claim at least conditional justification on behalf of perceptual beliefs, perhaps even justification outright. How mollifying this move will be will depend largely on the exact psychological story offered by the internalist.
	We were driven to SI by the role of mentalism in NED, along with the need for NED to focus on belief-independent beliefs. Can mentalism render perception belief-independent without embracing SI? It is possible to appeal to background beliefs, ascribing to them a metaevidential, rather than an evidential, role. That is, the background beliefs, instead of serving as part of the agent’s evidence for the perceptual belief, might play of the role of determining what counts as evidence for what. Richard Foley (1987) holds that e is evidence for S of h just in case S tacitly believes that e renders h probable, i.e., if S were to be sufficiently reflective, she would believe that e renders h sufficiently probable. I am presuming that this higher order belief is not posited as an additional premise in S’s argument for h but rather, an enabling condition that makes e adequate evidence of h (for S). Peter Markie (2004) holds a similar view, which he couches in terms of internalized epistemic norms and articulates explicitly in terms of bridging the gap between nondoxastic experiences and perceptual beliefs.​[29]​ Granting the background beliefs a metaevidential---hence nonevidential---status would block my conditional reliability reply; they aren’t evidence, thus aren’t premises, thus don’t render the process belief-dependent. They don’t even need to be justified in order to fulfill their epistemic role. This move would allow us to revert to the original perceptual functions involving just experiences and perceptual beliefs, while admitting the existence of conflicting epistemic functions. Unanchored demonworlders would have metaevidential background beliefs and therefore be justified in some but not all of their belief-independent beliefs. 
	There’s much to be said in favor of this sort of view, provided that one can swallow a subjectivist epistemology. Most of us cannot; we think that evidential relations are objective, at least in the sense that your sincerely believing that affirming the consequent is valid---or your having internalized the norm of affirming the consequent---does little or nothing to make the conjunction of q and p ⊃ q good evidence for p, especially if, e.g., you never had any decent excuse for believing that affirming the consequent was valid but have always endorsed it to spite your logic teacher. 
	As with the discussion of the epistemological theory of concepts above, this would be too quick for a conclusive dismissal of subjectivism. But all I’m trying to do right here is to show that reliabilism has plausible responses to the various twists on NED. If all the reliabilist needs to do to answer the demon is to deny subjectivism, reliabilists should be quite happy
	There is one last internalist view that needs to be considered. Mentalism, again, is the view that if two agents are mentally identical, then they are justificationally identical. I have been taking mentalism to be a kind of “constrained mentalism,” according to which the only relevant mental states or properties are the currently available beliefs and experiences of the cognizer. But what counts or should count as “mental” is notoriously unclear, and perhaps the mentalist can exploit this fact. A “liberated mentalism” would claim that justification supervenes on the mental, in some larger sense of ‘mental’.​[30]​ A liberated mentalist could, for example, appeal to past experiences not currently remembered, or cognitive architectural facts (e.g., that the belief was produced by a certain kind of module), or factive mental states of the agent, and so on. Not all of these mental properties are even possibly shared by our demon world counterparts, but some are. Such properties might allow the liberated mentalist to admit the possibility of conflicting epistemic functions, while still insisting that my demon world mental duplicate is justified in the same beliefs I am.
	To illustrate, let’s consider a liberated mentalist theory I think is very nearly true. Suppose that the novice and the ornithologist look out, have identical experiences, and both come to believe that there’s a pileated woodpecker in front of them. According to a “perceptual systems theory” of perception (Lyons 2005, 2009a), the significant difference between them is that the expert’s pileated woodpecker belief is the output of one of her perceptual modules, while the novice’s belief comes from somewhere else. They satisfy the same experience/belief mapping, but because of the cognitive architectural---mental---differences, one is justified and the other is not. I’m not sure whether my disembodied counterparts would have cognitive modules or not, but my molecule-for-molecule brain-in-a-vat duplicate certainly would. Some version of this perceptual systems theory could thus capture the claim that my duplicate is justified in just those perceptual functions I am justified in (because of these mental similarities), all the while allowing for the possibility of conflicting epistemic functions among mentally different agents.
	A more popular mentalist view holds that the agent’s actual history might matter to justification; that is, her training or learning history might affect which experiences justify which perceptual beliefs. And the claim here is that it’s the actual past, not the agent’s current memory appearances or beliefs about the past that make the difference.​[31]​
	Some brand of liberated mentalism is, to my mind, the most plausible form of internalism; it rejects EE and SI, after all. However, it doesn’t support NED against reliabilism. It gets the “right” answer concerning demonworlders, but for the wrong reasons. 
	What makes NED initially compelling is the intuitive plausibility of the idea that anything that shares my experiences and beliefs is justified in whatever beliefs as I am. Generalizing to the third person, we get constrained mentalism:
	(CM): 	If x and y are experientially and doxastically identical, then they are justificationally identical. 
I too have felt the intuitive pull of CM, although I find the first-person version significantly more attractive, and as I argued in section 3, the reasons for denying CM outweigh that pull. Reliabilism faces NED because reflection on demon scenarios inclines us to think that CM is true, but reliabilism is incompatible with CM. The liberated mentalist is in the same boat, however, since liberated mentalism expressly denies CM and therefore faces NED objections of its own.
	Liberated mentalism claims that mental factors outside the agent’s (current) beliefs and experiences affect the justificational status of that agent’s beliefs. But this means that I will have an experiential/doxastic counterpart who differs with respect to these other mental factors (learning history, cognitive modules, etc.) and therefore is not justified in beliefs that I am justified in. In general, there will be pairs of introspectively identical agents who nevertheless differ with respect to which beliefs are justified for them. Maybe this is a New New Evil Demon Problem, rather than the Old New Evil Demon Problem; either way, it is counterintuitive. But worse, I submit, it is counter to the very intuition that propels the New Evil Demon Problem for reliabilism, the intuition in favor of CM. For here is a possible agent who is exactly like me in all phenomenological and introspectable respects, but isn’t justified in holding certain beliefs that are justified for me. Thus, the liberated mentalist should be the last person to wield NED against reliabilism or in favor of her own view.
	I’m not sure how to prove that it’s really CM that serves as the intuitive lynchpin of NED. One could always try to argue that the plausibility of NED derives from an intuition in favor of the justificational equivalence of some broader class of cognitive counterparts. Liberated mentalism, after all, appeals to a broader supervenience base than does CM and is therefore at least as plausible a claim. However, consider a brain supervenience thesis:
	(BS): 	If two agents have (synchronically and diachronically) molecularly identical brains, then those agents are justificationally identical.
BS does have some intuitive plausibility, and it would support a brain-in-a-vat version of NED. But the intuitive plausibility of BS seems entirely parasitic on its being a generalized version of CM. Note, in fact, that it is a generalization of CM (i.e., CM entails BS) only on the assumption of semantic and phenomenal internalism. Reject those assumptions and BS retains little or no intuitive plausibility. Reinstate those assumptions, however, and BS is at least as plausible as CM, since the former is obviously a safer claim than the latter. Is it a point in favor of BS that it gets the intuitively “correct” (i.e., NED-friendly) result concerning brains in vats? Maybe, but it’s not a point in favor of a theory that defends BS while denying semantic and phenomenal internalism. Such a theory would imply that content and phenomenology are epistemically irrelevant (since pairs of physically identical brains will be vastly different at the level of content and phenomenology without any epistemic difference). This is a possibility we should take seriously, but while we are taking it seriously, NED ceases to have any intuitive traction.
	In just this way, liberated mentalism may be at least as plausible as CM (since it’s a safer claim) even while deriving all of its intuitive plausibility from CM. Liberated mentalism does get the intuitively “correct” result for brains in vats, but this is hardly a point in favor of a version of liberated mentalism that denies CM. Perhaps there are other arguments for liberated mentalism, arguments that don’t capitalize on the intuitive plausibility of the rejected CM. If so, the liberated mentalist should rely on these and not employ NED, an argument that by her own lights must have something wrong with it, since it (in its NNED incarnation, at least) concludes the falsehood of her own liberated mentalism.
	If none of this convinces, at least a parting tu quoque is in order: it is worth reiterating that liberated mentalism has its own demons to worry about and thus has no clear advantage over reliabilism as far as NED goes. 

6.	Beyond Perception
	I have been treating perception as the paradigmatic source of belief-independent beliefs, but the argument of the last three sections should generalize beyond perception. For example, I focused on demonworlders who were doxastically and phenomenally identical to us in order to ensure that their memories were conditionally reliable. But what about other demonworlders, who are being deceived in such a way that their memories are also systematically misleading, not even conditionally reliable? I can’t say that these demonworlders are doing something right, but after applying the lessons of the Grand Interworld Station, I think this is just as it should be. Suppose there is a certain kind of nondoxastic phenomenal experience associated with remembering. Surely, this isn’t what memory has to feel like; such an experience is only contingently associated with justified memory belief. Other possible agents aren’t justified in memory beliefs at all, though they could undergo that same experience; still others have justified memory beliefs, but they’re associated with some radically different experience, etc. Once again, we have conflicting epistemic functions,​[32]​ with no positive verdict to make on behalf of an unreliable demonworlder but perhaps a relativized one, and if our demonworlder is unanchored, then once more, there’s no way to discharge the relativization. Notice that the attempt examined in section 4, to reduce the contingency by building abstract contents into the experience, won’t even get off the ground here, for that part of the gap is already closed. The problem isn’t with the  ‘p’ part of the ‘seeming to remember that p’ but with the ‘seeming to remember’ part.​[33]​ 	
	The argument might also generalize to certain forms of inference. If the argument to this point has shaken us from the intuitive idea that the demonworlders are justified, perhaps we could extend it even to some of the belief-dependent processes glossed over earlier. 
	If we think of belief-dependent processes in the standard philosophical mode, deduction, direct inference, and the like will leap to mind. Suppose, however, that the human mind is “massively modular” (e.g., Carruthers 2006), consisting of numerous task-specific reasoning systems, in such a way that the domain-general methods, like deduction, enumerative induction, etc. either do not count as genuinely psychological processes, or are processes that are only sometimes involved in reasoning. These task-specific, modular, processes are, unlike their domain-general brethren, likely to be merely contingently reliable. Suppose, to take a toy example, that we have a theory-of-mind module that goes from ‘S says that p’ to ‘S (probably) believes p’. I don’t mean a perceptual or quasi-perceptual module that takes sensory stimulation of the sort common to S’s saying that p as inputs, but rather a reasoning module that takes the belief that S says that p as an input: the other wouldn’t involve a belief-dependent process; and I don’t mean a reasoning system that is sensitive to whether the agent happens to believe, even implicitly, that people normally only say things they believe to be true: that wouldn’t give us a contingently reliable process. What I have in mind is a cognitive process that is genuinely both belief-dependent and contingently reliable.​[34]​ Such a process is unreliable in demon worlds, and not plausibly even conditionally reliable, for it’s not the case that the outputs would be true if the inputs were. Does a NED-type objection arise here? 
	I think not, for it’s not obvious that these demonworlders’ beliefs are justified; the foregoing treatment of perception can be applied equally well here. We don’t want to rule out a priori the possibility of such massively modular processes yielding justified belief for some agents. At the same time, we don’t want to claim that just any agent can be justified in such an enthymematic inference as the current example. So there are some possible creatures for whom the move from ‘S says that p’ to ‘S (probably) believes p’ yields justified belief and others for whom it does not. More generally, for a great many values of e and h, there will be some cognizers who are justified in moving enthymematically (i.e., without having a justified belief in the corresponding conditional) from e to h and other cognizers who are not. So we are confronted with another class of conflicting epistemic functions. An unanchored demonworlder making such an inference by way of a categorically and conditionally unreliable process does not seem to be doing anything so epistemically right that we need to think of her as justified.
	Perhaps even some domain-general forms of inference are only contingently reliable. If so, then their use does not confer conditional justification in demon worlds, and again this ceases to be counterintuitive. Suppose there are worlds in which counter-induction is reliable: the more As have been Bs in the past, the more likely it is that the next A won’t be a B. The gambler’s fallacy would be a reliable mode of reasoning in these worlds. Plausibly, the use of counter-induction in these worlds might be justification-conferring; if so, then there’s yet another conflict in epistemic functions, and the rest of the story is well known by now: neither induction nor counter-induction confers justification in demon worlds.​[35]​
	This line of response to NED could be generalized even further, if desired. Part of the point of conditional justification was to provide an option for the reliabilist who wants to soften the consequences of in situ reliabilism. But the reliabilist is not required to accept this helping hand. If I have succeeded in reshaping our intuitions about perception and some forms of inference, perhaps this gives us a new perspective from which it does not seem absurd to claim that there is nothing epistemically good about even conditionally reliable inference from unjustified perceptual premises. The rest of the point of conditional justification was to steer the discussion toward belief-independent processes, in particular, perceptual processes, where it looks on further reflection like the simple reliabilist verdict of ‘unjustified’ was intuitively correct after all. Some reliabilists might thus view conditional reliability here as a ladder that got us to somewhere important but that can now be safely kicked away.
	I myself do think there is something important about the paired belief-dependent/belief-independent processes and conditional/categorical reliability distinctions. And I think there is something very plausible about the claim that the envatted logician is doing something epistemically right. But I’m happy not to force these views on other reliabilists.

7.	Conclusion
	I have argued that the New Evil Demon Problem is no embarrassment for in situ reliabilism. There are plenty of details to work out, but the epistemic status of demonworlders is no cause to abandon the central insights of a reliability theory of justification.
	NED is standardly taken to constitute a simple, knock-down argument against straightforward (de facto) versions of reliabilism. It is nothing of the sort. The argument makes substantive and controversial epistemic presuppositions, often incompatible with the theoretical commitments of those who wield the argument against reliabilism. The reliabilist has, on the face of it, a dialectically satisfactory response to anyone who holds that perception is belief-dependent. The main challenge to reliabilism must therefore come from proponents of Seemings Internalism, but SI is rife with problems of its own, the solutions to which require assumptions at least as controversial as reliabilism itself.
	I have dwelt on the dialectic of NED more than I would ordinarily want to, because the main thesis here is not so much about the truth of a certain form of reliabilism as about the failure of a certain type of argument against reliabilism. Thus, when certain unobvious, arcane, controversial philosophical positions arose as ways of salvaging the claim that demonworlders are justified in the same beliefs we are, I pointed out that the purpose of NED was to show that reliabilism is false, not to show that it is at odds with some controversial internalist epistemology. It really does matter to our discussion that NED is supposed to work much like Gettier’s (1963) famous counterexamples, regarding which nearly all of us have strong intuitive convictions, convictions which are independent of our antecedent epistemological commitments. Any unbiased outsider should be able to see that Gettier’s cases tell against the traditional analysis of knowledge. By contrast, if the only way to hold on to the NED intuition that our demon world counterparts are justified is to invoke subjectivism, or the epistemological theory of concepts, or the like, the game is already over. Obviously if one of those is true, reliabilism is false, but just as obviously there’s no reason to assume that the casualty of this conflict will have to be reliabilism; the choice (between, e.g., reliabilism and subjectivism) will have to be made on the basis of the overall successes of the respective theories. 
	This emphasis on the dialectic of NED is only part of the response to NED, however. The meat of the response is that reliabilism really does give a satisfactory account of the epistemic status of demonworlders. Their epistemically basic, or belief-independent, beliefs are unjustified, and in fact, have no positive epistemic status at all. But this is the intuitively correct verdict after all. When we stop thinking of the demonworlders as us in uncooperative environments and take seriously the (constrained) mentalism NED requires, we see the now unanchored demonworlders as mere perceptual functions. It is wildly implausible, and inconsistent with NED’s mentalism, to allow that all perceptual functions generate justification; it is unprincipled and arbitrary to claim that only some of them do (and chauvinistic if these happen to include pretty much just ours); the only option left is to deny that any unanchored demonworlders’ perceptual functions yield justification. Because they are in a demon world, and because they have no special connection to any other world, there is nothing to make one perceptual function better than another, nothing to make one mapping minimally good.
	Thus, the reliabilist claims that the demonworlders are indeed unjustified in many of their beliefs, but this is not biting the bullet, for it is no longer counterintuitive to claim that our demon world counterparts are not justified in their perceptual beliefs. The intuitively persuasive cases of justified demonworlders (you and I transported to epistemically hostile environments) are not compelling instances of unreliable processes; the intuitively persuasive cases of unreliable processes (native, unanchored demonworlders) are not compelling instances of justified belief. In fact, these are fairly plausible instances of unjustified belief, and some kind of externalism seems better equipped than internalism to handle this result.
	Nevertheless, I do not claim that no demon world beliefs have any positive epistemic status. Reliabilism has the resources to ascribe a positive epistemic status to a number of beliefs formed even in environments that are generally not conducive to truth. Some processes will be reliable even in these environments, and some others will be conditionally reliable; these will give us justified and conditionally justified beliefs, respectively. Inferential processes might be categorically unreliable but still yield justified beliefs, because the component processes are reliable or conditionally reliable. Unjustified but conditionally justified beliefs might have a positive enough epistemic status to appease the internalist, or at least assuage the reliabilist’s guilt. So even though the demonworlder’s perceptual beliefs are unjustified (and not even conditionally justified), her memories and inferences might have positive epistemic status nonetheless, falling short of (categorical) justification only due of the verdict about perception just embraced. 
	The response to NED, therefore, is partly conciliatory---where (some) belief-dependent processes are concerned---and partly defiant---where belief-independent processes are concerned.
	There are residual problems for reliabilism. I claimed early on that in situ reliabilism makes up a family of theories, and there is a lot of flexibility regarding how narrowly to read the ‘situ’. Just as I want my epistemology to imply that a subject undergoing a convincing hallucination might still be justified, I want my epistemology to allow recently envatted brains to be justified as well.​[36]​ (Not everyone, of course, shares these desiderata). Perhaps evil demon considerations can be put to use by helping us decide which articulation of ‘in situ’---where the agent is/has been/will be---to endorse. The connection between truth and justification will be complex and indirect---the treatment of belief-independent and belief-dependent processes already ensures this. But better complex than virtually nonexistent, as the connection is on internalist theories and some competing versions of reliabilism. The notion of anchoring has been central, and this will also need to be spelled out. It is hoped that these two problems---anchoring and the scope of ‘in situ’---can be solved concurrently and in a way that is congenial to reliabilism; the analogy to skills seems promising here, but the details will have to wait. It is not obvious that an account of anchoring in terms of, say, reliable track record, is preferable to, say, one in terms of phylogenetic history and proper function, but that is a very different problem for reliabilism than the one Cohen and Lehrer left us with.
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^1	  I frame the discussion in terms of process reliabilism rather than indicator reliabilism. All the important claims should apply to the latter view as well.
^2	  Internalists who endorse NED against reliabilism are too numerous to try to cite exhaustively. A few random examples are BonJour 2010, Feldman 2003, Haack 1993, Pollock and Cruz 1999; Huemer 2001 employs it not against reliabilism but in favor of his internalism. Reliabilists of various sorts have taken the argument quite seriously and offered modified versions of reliabilism accordingly. See Comesaña 2002, 2010, Goldman 1986, 1988, 1992, Henderson and Horgan 2001, Sosa 1993. I will refer to the NED-wielding opponents of reliabilism as internalists, in an undefined sense of the term. This is much less a serious attribution than the use of a convenient label.
^3	  My concern throughout will be with the in situ varieties of reliabilism. Consequently, and to reduce clutter, I’ll drop the ‘in situ’ or ‘de facto’ qualifications, except for an occasional reminder. Any claims I make about reliability, if not explicitly marked to the contrary, should be read as claims about reliability in the agent’s environment.
^4	  There are actually three distinct properties that are held to be coextensive: psychological belief-dependence, epistemological belief-dependence, and the property of being the kind of process for which the justification-conferring type of reliability is conditional, rather than categorical. I think Goldman (1979) is wrong to claim, as a general rule, that any process that is psychologically belief-dependent is epistemologically belief-dependent (Lyons 2009a, pp. 137--8): introspection, for instance, sometimes takes beliefs as inputs (as, e.g., when I introspect that I believe that p), but the epistemic status of my introspective belief does not depend at all on the epistemic status of the introspected belief. I need not be justified in believing that p, to be justified in believing that I believe that p. Similarly, even if certain perceptual processes are cognitively penetrable and therefore (psychologically) belief-dependent, the justificatory status of the resulting perceptual belief has little to do with the justification of the penetrating belief (for an argument, see Lyons forthcoming). In addition, it seems that we want to require of these processes (i.e., introspection and perception) categorical, rather than conditional, reliability.
^5	  To say that it is not irrational is not to say that it’s “weakly justified” (Goldman 1988) or “personally justified” (Engel 1992) or the like.
^6	  I mean psychologically belief-dependent here. Where the context disambiguates, I won’t bother with the qualifier.
^7	  Are direct inference and other forms of inductive inference conditionally reliable in phenomenologically consistent demon worlds? One way to understand conditional reliability is in terms of actual frequencies, ignoring those instances where falsehoods are/have been among the inputs. Alternatively, one might use a counterfactual approach: the process would produce a large number of truths were it to receive true inputs. Neither way seems to pose an insurmountable obstacle for the claim that these types of inference are conditionally reliable in worlds governed by consistent demons. What about a Humean world where nature has been uniform up until now, but the laws of nature are about to change, a situation arguably more likely to obtain in demon worlds than in non-demon worlds? (Thanks to John Greco for raising this question.) Again, it is not obvious that the reliabilist cannot, with some plausibility, count such a process as reliable.
^8	  I’m frankly not sure whether abduction is or is not conditionally reliable in demon worlds, and a careful examination of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Deciding on this will depend on the psychological details. Do we rationally intuit that theory A is simpler than theory B, and that simpler theories are more likely to be true, and then deduce that A is likelier than B? If so, abduction will parallel the Cartesian account of perception discussed above, and abductive inference is justification-conferring in demon worlds. To argue that reliabilism gets the wrong verdict regarding abduction, one would have to argue in some detail that abduction is not conditionally reliable in demon worlds. To do that, one would have to offer a different account of abduction than the one just sketched. I don’t take the matter of abduction in demon worlds to be settled, but I’ll leave it as unfinished business. I suggest below, in section 6, that it might not matter how we resolve this question.
^9	  Whether or not reliabilism is right to hold that all psychologically belief-dependent beliefs are thereby epistemologically belief-dependent, the converse is true: all epistemologically belief-dependent beliefs are psychologically belief-dependent. If it helps, we can think of such background beliefs as being encoded not as activation patterns across the input layer of a connectionist network, but as being encoded in the weights. Such states aren’t beliefs in the transient and occurrent sense of ‘belief’, but this is not the only legitimate sense of ‘belief’, even for a reliabilist. Beliefs of this sort can make a causal difference, in that without them, different output patterns would result, and these beliefs also make (or so we are supposing) an epistemic difference, in that if the agent were not justified in these standing, background beliefs, she would not be justified in the output beliefs. Together, these seem to me sufficient reason to treat the background beliefs as inputs to a psychologically belief-dependent process.
^10	  This view has been held by a great number of epistemologists, starting, perhaps, with Reid ([1785] 1967). Contemporary and explicit defenses of the view begin, I think, with Quinton (1966), though Pollock (1974, 1986, 1995; Pollock and Cruz 1999) probably deserves the most credit for really developing and articulating the view. Part of its current popularity may be due to proponents like Huemer (2001) and Pryor (2000), who call it “Phenomenal Conservatism” and “Dogmatism,” respectively.
^11	  Spiderman is said to have a “spider sense,” which warns him of impending danger; Socrates was said (by himself, apparently) to have had a daemon that did much the same for him.
^12	  This is because we are assuming the belief-independence of perceptual belief; a more general---but more cumbersome for the present purposes---would be that of a mapping from mental states more generally to beliefs.
^13	  Conflict among epistemic functions, as here defined, requires that there be some belief-independent beliefs. Epistemic functions can’t conflict unless one counts a certain experience-belief mapping as justified while another counts it as unjustified, and this can’t happen unless some experience-belief mappings are justified, and this can’t happen unless some experiences justify independently of other beliefs, i.e., unless there are belief-independent beliefs. The existence of belief-independent beliefs is the part of the story that SI gets right.
^14	  One is reminded of Richard Dawkins’s recent claims to the effect that we are all atheists about the vast majority of the gods. The difference between Christians and Dawkins is that he goes just one god further.
^15	  My cognitive processes have a track record of getting things right, and the reliabilist can plausibly claim that even in a demon world---at least for some length of time---the processes count as reliable.
^16	  See Henderson and Horgan (2006) for a contrary view, concerning the epistemological analogue.
^17	  None of this, of course, is to claim that the unanchored Phelps duplicate is a bad swimmer either (on the grounds that there’s a range of possible body/environment/world complexes that he swims poorly in); that would be to make the same mistake in the other direction. As mentioned briefly earlier, when the reliabilist claims a belief is unjustified, there is no implication that the agent is thereby doing anything wrong, just that she’s not doing anything right.
^18	  Thanks to Jeremy Fantl for this objection.
^19	  I endorsed option one in response to Fantl’s objection at the Rutgers Epistemology Conference (May, 2011), though I now think I prefer option two. For the present purposes, I think it is good to show that there are various ways out for the reliabilist.
^20	  Thanks to Alvin Goldman for this formulation.
^21	  Could we just allow them to be justified in whatever perceptual function they satisfy? In addition to being implausible on the face of it, this would be incompatible with the mentalist thesis that NED is supposed to establish, since some demonworlders will satisfy the same perceptual function as some unjustified agent, which would conflict with the claim that any psychologically identical agents are justificationally identical.
^22	  One could endorse EE but not SI by rejecting evidentialism (e.g., hold that basic beliefs aren’t based on evidence at all) or by requiring that basic beliefs be about the agent’s mental states, not about the external world.
^23	  I’m not sure what the proponents of Seemings Internalism really understand their seemings to be. I have tried in other places (Lyons 2009a, 2009b, 2010) to point out the need for clarification on this point. By appealing to experiences as of p (and the like), where p is also the content of a possible belief, SI seems to be reaching for these high level, abstract states. It would be nice to name names, but I’m afraid I can do so only tentatively. I think the view just sketched in the text is that of Pollock and Cruz (1999) and Huemer (2001, 2007); it may, for all I know, be standard for SI.
^24	  This move may be illicit by SI’s lights for other reasons. Seemings are typically thought to be nondoxastic states that cause beliefs; this is important if beliefs are supposed to be epistemically based on seemings and if the basing relation is a causal relation. It is far from clear whether beliefs could be based on seemings, if seemings are properties of beliefs. Huemer (2007) hints both that seemings cause beliefs (p. 31) and also that they are properties of beliefs (p. 47).
^25	  See Conee and Feldman’s (2001) response to Plantinga (1996), whom they take to be offering a similar argument. I’m not sure that this is quite what Plantinga is getting at there (1996, p. 360), and even so, Conee and Feldman take the problematic implication to be one of (ultima facie) justification, where I am complaining that our current version of SI would imply that all beliefs are prima facie justified, not that they’re justified. I think this is bad enough.
^26	  This is even more plausible when we keep in mind that what is at issue here is prima facie attractiveness and the like, rather than resultant attractiveness (see Sosa 2007 for more on this distinction). SI wouldn’t bother to cast itself as a theory about prima facie justification unless it meant for the perceptual seemings to be prima facie rather than resultant; I’m prima facie justified in believing that the upper line of the Müller-Lyer illusion is longer, even though I’m not resultantly inclined to believe it (nor does it resultantly seem true, attractive, etc.)
^27	  Still, there is some property that the belief that 2+2=4 has that other beliefs, e.g., the belief in the Banach-Tarski theorem, lack: for one, it has the property of having a content that I cannot entertain without being inclined to believe it. What if we let that property count as our seeming-true? It won’t help SI, for this property is one that the belief ‘there’s something red in front of me’ doesn’t (and hence couldn’t) have.
^28	  There couldn’t even be satisfaction of conflicting perceptual functions on this view unless some agents’ satisfaction of some functions was due to pervasive performance error: they in some sense knew this wasn’t the right doxastic response but nevertheless always responded thus.
^29	  I am not sure how Markie conceives of the norms and thus not sure whether his view should be classified here as one that appeals to metaevidential beliefs, or whether it should be classified with the next group of internalist theories I discuss.
^30	  I use ‘constrained’ and ‘liberated’ because ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ would misleadingly suggest the semantic issues set aside at the beginning of the paper.
^31	  Sarah Wright (2010) holds this view for virtue-theoretic reasons, and Richard Feldman tells me (personal communication) that he is at least somewhat inclined to believe it (see the postscript to “Evidentialism” in Conee and Feldman 2004).
^32	  With ‘epistemic functions’ redefined in the obvious---broader---way, to take in more than perceptual functions.
^33	  I suspect that introspection can be dealt with similarly, to handle cases where the demon makes someone an unreliable introspector. I won’t try to spell out the details, however.
^34	  I am assuming (pace, perhaps, Coady 1992) that the connection between S’s saying and believing p is a thoroughly contingent one. Readers who disagree should imagine a different toy example.
^35	  Thanks to John Greco for helping me to work out much of the last four paragraphs. 
^36	  How recently? Mark Johnston suggests (in conversation) that a long envatted brain will, so to speak, lose reliability before it loses anchoring. We will continue to count her as justified (rightly so, as the agent is still anchored in our world) long after we have stopped counting her processes as reliable. I’m not entirely sure what to think about this case. You don’t cease to be a skilled swimmer just because you’re having a bad day, even if that bad day is the result of you becoming a brain in a vat. At some point, though, in dealing with a long envatted brain, it will seem right to say that she used to be a good swimmer---and could be again, were she appropriately reembodied---but not that she still is. Similarly, it doesn’t seem crazy to me to say of a long envatted perceiver that a particular belief used to be the proper response to experience---and could be again, were she appropriately reembodied---but not that it still is. If so, then it shouldn’t seem crazy to say of the long envatted perceiver that she’s no longer justified, though of course there won’t be much point in trying to figure out when she stopped being justified.
